On September 15, 2026, Chiesi, a family-owned pharmaceutical group from Parma, announced the appointment of David Khougazian as Chief Executive Officer of the group, effective October 15. On the same day, CordenPharma, a pharmaceutical contract manufacturer owned by the Astorg fund, announced that Jean-Luc Herbeaux will take over as CEO on October 1. Two days later, Bavarian Nordic, a Danish vaccine specialist, named Tarja Stenvall as President and Chief Executive Officer, taking office on October 15. On September 18, Ipsen announced the co-optation of a new female director to the committee that arbitrates its product portfolio.

Four announcements in four days, in four mid-sized organizations at different stages of their history. Each was commented on individually. Placed side-by-side, they describe with unusual precision how the boards of directors of European pharma are organizing the succession of their leaders today: who they are looking for, from where, with what mandate, and how they manage the interval between the departure of one and the arrival of the other.

This is not a chronicle of appointments. It is a reading grid, built on dated cases, for boards that will have to decide on a succession over the next twelve months.

Key figures to know

Why this topic matters now

Three leaders are taking office within the next fifteen days. That is the first reason. The second lies in what these three cases have in common, which is far from trivial.

All three new CEOs are external hires. David Khougazian arrives from Flagship Pioneering, the Cambridge-based venture creation firm, where he was Executive Partner in charge of growth. Tarja Stenvall arrives from Sanofi, where she headed the global diabetes and cardiovascular franchise, a portfolio of approximately ten billion euros. Jean-Luc Herbeaux arrives from Hovione, a Portuguese pharmaceutical contract manufacturer that he led for over four years after serving as its Chief Operating Officer. None of the three organizations promoted an internal candidate.

The three mandates are growth mandates. Chiesi talks about the "next phase of innovation-driven growth," CordenPharma of the "next phase of growth," and Bavarian Nordic of strengthening its "global vaccine leadership position." The word growth is not just a press release convention. It defines the profile sought: in all three cases, someone who has already scaled an organization or a portfolio, rather than someone who has stabilized a situation.

The three transitions are fast. Sixteen days at CordenPharma, twenty-eight at Bavarian Nordic, and thirty at Chiesi between the announcement and taking office. These short timelines mean that the executive searches were completed, and notice periods negotiated, long before the announcement. A succession announced with a one-month transition is a succession that has been worked on for several months beforehand.

Two false interpretations of this sequence of events are circulating. The first views it as a calendar coincidence, three boards finding themselves, by chance, at the same point in their cycle. The second sees it as a deeper trend, a "new generation" of leaders replacing the previous one. Neither holds up. What these cases show is a set of governance choices, made separately by three different boards, which converge because they respond to the same constraints.

The profile of the mid-cap pharma CEO in 2026

The table below compares the three appointments side-by-side. It is not intended to rank individuals, but rather to reveal what the boards were looking for.

Three lessons emerge.

The CEO's background answers the specific question the board is asking, not a generic template. Chiesi, where innovation is the announced lever, went to find someone whose job for years has been growing biotech companies and building partnerships. Bavarian Nordic, which must transition from a business driven by government contracts to a global commercial enterprise, went to recruit a leader who has run a ten-billion commercial franchise. CordenPharma, which has quadrupled in size through acquisitions, went to recruit an executive who has already run a direct competitor. In all three cases, the new CEO's career path is the literal answer to the question of the moment.

External recruitment is a deliberate choice, not a failure. Recruiting an external leader is often read as a sign of an insufficient internal talent pool. These three cases suggest otherwise: when the mandate is a phase change, the board looks for someone who has already lived through the next phase elsewhere. An internal executive, however strong, by definition has experience of the current phase.

The speed of the transition is an indicator of preparation, not haste. A gap of two to four weeks between the announcement and arrival is only possible if the candidate has been released from their commitments, which is negotiated long before the name is made public. These three boards clearly had a successful search completed at the time of the announcement.

The CFO interim: what it enables, what it costs

At Chiesi, the board entrusted the interim general management to Jean-Marc Bellemin, Chief Financial Officer, effective May 15, 2026, while leaving him in his financial role. The interim will have lasted five months.

This is the most common solution in organizations of this size, and for good reason. The CFO knows all operations through their numbers, is already the main interlocutor for the board and shareholders, and their appointment reassures financial partners. It allows the board to conduct a search without the pressure of an empty seat, which, judging by the thirty-day gap between the announcement and the arrival of the successor, is exactly what Chiesi did.

It also has a cost, which boards often underestimate. For five months, the finance function is run by someone who is also running everything else. Decisions that commit the future—a research partnership, an acquisition, a launch—are mechanically put on hold or taken by a leader who knows they will not be the one executing them. And for the CFO themselves, the question of what comes next arises: either they were a candidate and were not selected, or they were not, and carried a heavy workload for five months knowing it would not lead to the permanent position. In either case, the new CEO inherits a CFO whose relationship to the job has changed.

A board choosing this solution therefore has three issues to address even before launching the search: tell the CFO clearly whether they are a candidate or not, set a time limit on the interim, and define what the interim leader is authorized to decide alone.

Keeping the predecessor on the board: advantage or hindrance

At CordenPharma, Michael Quirmbach, CEO since 2019 and with the company since 2014, becomes a board member and senior advisor. The shareholder, Astorg, praises "an outstanding contribution" over twelve years. The new leader therefore arrives with the person who built the company they are taking over sitting on the board.

This configuration is common in private equity-owned companies, and it is justified. The outgoing leader knows the clients, the sites, the teams, and the acquisitions currently being integrated, including that of a peptide specialist. Their presence secures continuity with pharmaceutical clients, for whom a change of leadership at a supplier is a supply risk.

It also creates an asymmetry that the board must manage. The new CEO makes decisions under the gaze of the person whose choices they may, at times, undo. Teams know whom they can still turn to. And the board itself may be tempted to measure the successor against the predecessor, even though they recruited him for a different phase.

Experience shows that this configuration works when three conditions are met: the scope of the advisory role is written down, its duration is limited, and the board chair, or the fund, explicitly arbitrates in favor of the new leader at the first disagreement. When these conditions are lacking, the successor spends their first year negotiating their authority instead of exercising it.

The external growth mandate and what it demands

The Ipsen case sheds light on the third point from another angle. On September 17, the board co-opted Mariette Finet, a medical doctor, former member of the medical management of Laboratoires Beaufour and then Ipsen, and scientific advisor to the family shareholder since 2007. She joins the product portfolio committee, which informs capital allocation choices and trade-offs between therapeutic assets. The business press estimates the group's acquisition capacity at around 3.2 billion euros, with revenue growing by 10.9% in 2025 and a 2026 target exceeding 13% growth.

What this co-optation shows is that the external growth mandate is not only played out at the CEO level. It is prepared at the board level, through the composition of the committees that decide on what is bought. A CEO recruited to make acquisitions, like the three this week, needs a board capable of evaluating them scientifically, not just financially.

For the leader themselves, the external growth mandate requires three things that the backgrounds of the three new CEOs reveal. An ability to evaluate an asset before evaluating a price, which David Khougazian practiced for years in venture capital. Integration experience, meaning what happens after signing, which Jean-Luc Herbeaux experienced from both sides, as COO then as CEO. And sufficient commercial legitimacy for acquisitions to translate into sales, which Tarja Stenvall's ten-billion franchise documents.

What this requires of leadership roles

A CEO succession is not an isolated event at the summit. It shifts the scope of several roles.

None of these transitions are spontaneous. A board that has not appointed a CEO for seven years, which is the case for CordenPharma, or that has undergone a recent reorganization, which is the case for Bavarian Nordic, often discovers that succession is a discipline they rarely practice.

The case of family-owned mid-caps and private equity-backed companies

The three cases this week cover the two most common capital structures in European mid-cap pharma, and they do not pose the problem in the same way.

In a family-owned mid-cap, like Chiesi, the succession of a non-family leader involves the relationship between the family and management. The chair, Maria Paola Chiesi, champions the appointment and recalls that innovation is "at the heart of the mission and long-term vision" of the group. The mandate of the new CEO is therefore framed by a vision that precedes him and will outlast him. The recruited leader must be able to fit into this vision without being diluted by it. The status as a certified B Corp benefit corporation adds a consistency constraint that few leaders from venture capital have had to respect.

In a private equity-backed company, like CordenPharma, succession is paced by the fund's timeline. Astorg acquired the company in 2022; a new CEO appointed in late 2026 will, in all likelihood, have to lead the next valuation stage. The predecessor kept on the board secures continuity in the eyes of clients and, when the time comes, buyers. But the mandate is shorter and more measurable, and the leader knows this when signing.

In a listed company following an aborted buyout offer, like Bavarian Nordic, succession takes place under the gaze of shareholders who refused an exit. The reconstituted board must demonstrate that the value they preferred to keep exists. The choice of a leader from a large-scale commercial franchise is, in itself, a response to this expectation.

Common mistakes

Confusing continuity with safety. Promoting an internal candidate because they know the company is reassuring, but they have experience of the current phase, not the next one. The three boards this week made the opposite choice, and their transition timelines show they did so without rushing.

Leaving the interim without a written mandate. A CFO who leads on an interim basis without knowing if they are a candidate, what they can decide alone, or until when, is not leading: they are waiting. Five months of waiting is costly in a company driven by innovation.

Keeping the predecessor on the board without defining their role. The presence of the outgoing leader secures clients and teams, provided their scope is written down and the board arbitrates in favor of the successor at the first disagreement.

Hiring based on track record rather than the current business phase. A leader who has grown an organization through acquisitions and a leader who has turned around an organization in difficulty have equally brilliant track records but different skills. The board must first identify the phase, then look for the profile.

Neglecting board composition when changing the CEO. An external growth mandate assumes directors capable of evaluating therapeutic assets. Ipsen did this in the same month. This is the exception rather than the rule.

Announcing before securing the start date. A transition period of several months between announcement and arrival exposes the company to a period where everyone knows who is coming and no one makes decisions. The three cases this week show that one month is enough when the search is completed.

How to evaluate a CEO candidate for this type of mandate

1. Have they already led the exact phase the company is entering, and not just a neighboring one? Ask for the specific case, the starting situation, the ending situation, and what was decided in between. Growth through acquisitions and organic growth are not learned the same way.

2. Have they ever taken over a company where the founder or predecessor remained present? What they did during the first disagreements, and how they brought them to the board, reveals if they know how to exercise authority that is quietly contested.

3. Do they know how to evaluate a scientific asset before its price? For an external growth mandate, this question is decisive. A leader who entirely delegates scientific evaluation to their teams will buy what their teams want to buy.

4. How do they describe their first hundred days in an organization they do not know? The answer distinguishes the one who listens before deciding from the one who applies a method brought from elsewhere. Neither attitude is good in itself; the right one depends on the phase.

5. What is their understanding of the capital structure? A leader talking to a family, a fund, or listed shareholders who have refused an offer is not talking to the same person. Their ability to name this difference tells if they understand to whom they will report.

Frequently asked questions

Why do mid-sized pharma companies recruit their CEO externally? Because the mandate is most often a phase change—growth through acquisitions, internationalization, moving from one model to another—and the board looks for someone who has already lived through this phase elsewhere. The three September 2026 appointments at Chiesi, Bavarian Nordic, and CordenPharma are all external, with leaders coming from venture capital, big pharma, and a direct competitor respectively.

How long does a CEO interim managed by the CFO last? At Chiesi, the interim lasted five months, from May 15 to October 15, 2026, with the CFO retaining his function during this period. This duration corresponds to that of a completed executive search, notice period included. A longer interim usually signals a search that has not succeeded, or a board that has not made a decision.

Is it a good idea to keep the former CEO on the board of directors? It secures clients, teams, and ongoing acquisitions, which explains why private equity-backed companies often do so, like CordenPharma in 2026. This works if the predecessor's role is written down, limited in time, and if the board explicitly arbitrates in favor of the new leader at the first disagreement.

What is the typical timeframe between the announcement of a new CEO and their start date? In the three September 2026 cases, between sixteen and thirty days. A short timeframe indicates that the search was closed and the notice period negotiated before the announcement. A delay of several months exposes the company to a period of uncertainty where the organization waits for the announced leader.

What is an external growth mandate for a pharma CEO? A mandate where the main lever is the acquisition of assets, companies, or licenses rather than organic growth. It requires the leader to have an ability to evaluate an asset before its price, experience in integration after signing, and sufficient commercial legitimacy to transform acquisitions into sales. It also requires board directors capable of scientifically evaluating what the company buys, as Ipsen did by co-opting a medical doctor as a board member on the product portfolio committee on September 17, 2026.

How does a board prepare a CEO succession? By first identifying the phase the company is entering, then translating this phase into a profile, limiting the interim if there is one, writing down the predecessor's role if they stay, and verifying that the composition of the board itself corresponds to the mandate it is handing over. The successful successions this week were worked on several months before being announced.

Key takeaways

• Three mid-sized European pharma companies, Chiesi, Bavarian Nordic, and CordenPharma, appointed a new CEO between September 15 and 17, 2026, with start dates between October 1 and 15.

• All three leaders come from the outside, with a growth mandate, and their background literally answers the question each board was asking: innovation, global commercial expansion, acquisitions.

• The transition times of sixteen to thirty days show that searches were completed before the announcement. Speed is an indicator of preparation.

• The interim by the CFO, five months at Chiesi, is an effective solution provided it is bounded, written down, and clarified for the interim leader themselves.

• Keeping the predecessor on the board, as at CordenPharma, secures continuity if their role is bounded and the board arbitrates in favor of the successor.

• The external growth mandate is also prepared in the composition of the board, as shown by the co-optation of a medical doctor as a board member on Ipsen's product portfolio committee.

Laroze Partners' Perspective

Most executive successions are judged after the fact, by the successor's performance. This is the wrong time. What determines the success of a succession is decided before the announcement: the phase the board identified, the profile it deduced from it, how it organized the interval, and what it did with the predecessor.

The three cases this week are instructive because they were, visibly, prepared. The choice of external leaders is not an admission of weakness in the internal pipeline, but the logical consequence of a phase change. The short transition times say that the boards worked ahead. And the chosen setups—the CFO interim at Chiesi, the predecessor on the board at CordenPharma—are neither good nor bad in themselves: they succeed or fail depending on what the board writes down.

This is the reading we bring to a board preparing a succession, before looking for a name. The Laroze Pattern®, our method for strategically reading career paths, leadership behaviors, and performance dynamics, allows us to distinguish, in a leader's background, what proves they have already led the targeted phase from what only suggests it. A leader who has grown a franchise has not necessarily demonstrated that they know how to buy and integrate. A leader who has bought and integrated has not necessarily demonstrated that they know how to work under the gaze of the person they are replacing.

The successions that hold will not be those that found the most brilliant profile. They will be those where the board was able to say, before searching, which phase it was opening and under what conditions it was handing over the mandate.

Sources

Chiesi Press Release, September 15, 2026 · CordenPharma Press Release, September 15, 2026 · Bavarian Nordic Press Release, September 17, 2026 · PharmaVoice, September 28, 2026 · Refrance, September 18, 2026 (co-optation to the Ipsen board, 2025 results, and 2026 targets) · Bloomberg, March 2, 2026 (departure of Bavarian Nordic CEO).