On 15 September 2025, Luca de Meo took over as chief executive officer of Kering. François-Henri Pinault, who had combined the roles of chairman and chief executive officer since 2005, retained the chairmanship of the board of directors. Twelve months later, the group has published a first half that marks a return to growth on a comparable basis: +1% over six months, +2% in the second quarter, after a stable first quarter.

One year is a date that boards of directors know well. It is the moment when one stops commenting on an executive's arrival and begins to judge what he has done. It is also the most dangerous moment at which to judge, because the twelve-month figures of a turnaround are at once the most visible and the least representative. A cleaned-up balance sheet can be read at a glance. A brand that regains its desirability, a team that holds, an organization that decides faster, are read much later.

This article passes no judgment on the management of Kering or on those who lead it. The group is a public, documented case that allows two questions useful to any board facing a turnaround to be put. How are roles shared between a family shareholder who chairs and an operator executive who executes? And on what criteria does one assess, at twelve months, an executive whose mandate is measured in years?

The figures to know

Why this subject matters now

Three reasons, which have to do with the calendar and not with the news of any one group.

The first anniversary has passed. Twelve months after taking office, the grace period comes to an end. Shareholders, directors, teams and partners expect an assessment, even if the executive himself, and the plan he has presented, work to a horizon that runs to 2030. The ReconKering plan dates only from April: it has existed for six months when the mandate has existed for twelve. This gap between the time of the mandate and the time of the plan is a classic source of misunderstanding between a board and its chief executive.

The first positive sign is the moment when one is most often mistaken. When a group that was declining stops declining, two readings compete. The first concludes that the turnaround is secured. The second, that it is only a technical rebound. Neither is founded until one has broken down what has improved: the balance sheet, margins, the desirability of the brands, or only the comparison base.

The separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive officer has become a general governance subject. It is increasingly common in large listed groups, and everywhere it raises the same question: what does the chairman keep when he entrusts execution to someone else, and what does the chief executive officer now decide without him? Family shareholders face it with particular acuteness, because their chairmanship is not only a function, it is also a patrimony.

Two false readings circulate. The first reduces the subject to the relationship between two people, as if the success of a separation depended on the quality of their understanding. It depends first on what the board has written, that is, on the allocation of decisions. The second judges a turnaround by its first growth figure. Yet a growth figure measures what has happened, not what has become solid.

Sharing the roles: what the family keeps, what the operator receives

At Kering, the separation was announced in June 2025: François-Henri Pinault keeps the chairmanship of the board, Luca de Meo receives the role of chief executive officer. The chairman declared at the time: "It is with full confidence that I hand over the leadership of Kering and of our teams" (FashionUnited, June 2025). The shareholding family, through its holding company, remains the group's reference shareholder. The division is therefore public, formalized and dated.

What can be said of such a configuration, without judging how it is applied, fits in one table.

The table does not describe Kering. It describes what a board writes, or should write, when it separates the roles. In 2026, Kering brought onto its board two directors from outside the core of fashion, a former Chanel executive and the chief executive officer of a hotel group. In September 2026, the group also entrusted the general secretariat, that is, governance, legal affairs and internal control, to an executive who has been with the group since 2017 (Option Finance, 15 September 2026). These elements show that board composition and the governance function are treated as subjects in their own right, not as matters of housekeeping.

For a shareholding family, separation requires three renunciations. Renouncing operational decisions, including when one knows the operations better than anyone. Renouncing continuous arbitration, and accepting to arbitrate only at scheduled moments. Renouncing the reading of every difficulty as a fault of the executive, when it may be the price of the turnaround. The reverse is equally true: the executive must accept that the chairman retains legitimacy over the heritage and over the long term, and that certain decisions do not belong to the operator.

A turnaround is read in phases, not in figures

The ReconKering plan has the merit of being public about its phases: reset by the end of 2026, rebuild by 2028, reclaim by 2030 (Journal du Luxe, April 2026). This sequencing gives a board, whatever its sector, a simple reading grid: for each phase, a type of indicator, and a type of executive.

In the first half of 2026, the figures published by Kering sit mostly in the reset column: net debt of 3.3 billion euros against 8.0 at the end of 2025, 84 net store closures against an annual target of around 100, a recurring operating margin of 12.8%. These are, in the literal sense, clean-up indicators. Net income, down more than 60%, reflects for its part reorganisation costs, which is expected during this phase. The first signs of the next phase are appearing: +2% comparable growth in the second quarter, a sequential improvement at Gucci, from -8% to -2%.

A board reading these figures must guard against two misreadings. The first consists in asking, after one year, for the indicators of phase three. The second consists in settling for the indicators of phase one, because they are spectacular. Debt falling by 4.7 billion euros in six months is a major fact, but the press release itself specifies that the cash generated includes proceeds from real estate and beauty disposals. It proves a capacity to execute a financial plan. It proves nothing about the desirability of a brand.

The central asset: what a recovering brand measures, and does not measure

In almost every luxury group, one asset carries a disproportionate share of the result. At Kering, it is Gucci: 2.76 billion euros of revenue for the half, nearly 38% of the group, and according to the press, around 60% of operating income (Journal du Luxe, April 2026). The brand has been led since September 2025 by Francesca Bellettini, chairwoman and chief executive officer of Gucci, previously deputy chief executive officer of Kering in charge of brand development (FashionUnited, 18 September 2025). Creative direction is in the hands of Demna.

What the first half shows: Gucci is still down 5% on a comparable basis over six months, but down only 2% in the second quarter against 8% in the first, with a recurring operating margin of 17.0%, up one point. The press release speaks of a marked acceleration in directly operated sales, a seven-point improvement between the two quarters.

The useful question for a board is not whether Gucci "is doing well". It is what a brand turnaround changes, in what order, and at what speed. A luxury brand recovers in four stages: product, narrative, network, then customers. The first-half figures mainly say where things stand in the third. Customers, for their part, are read late. A board that assesses an executive at twelve months on the growth of the flagship brand alone is judging a lagging indicator.

What this requires of leadership functions

A turnaround does not rest on a single executive. It shifts the content of several functions, including that of the board itself.

None of these transitions is spontaneous. The fastest turnaround on paper is often the one that places the greatest demands on governance functions, because decisions are taken there faster than the rules that frame them.

The particular case of groups with a controlling family shareholder

Family control changes three things in the assessment of an operator executive.

The horizon of judgment. A family shareholder thinks in ten or twenty years, and can therefore tolerate a reset phase that the market hurries. But this patience has value only if it is stated. An executive who does not know how long the family is prepared to grant him is managing blind, and a board that does not put it into words leaves hanging an uncertainty that costs the teams.

The question of legitimacy. An operator executive from another sector draws his legitimacy from his previous results and his method. A family chairman draws his from the history of the house. These two legitimacies complement each other when each knows what it does not cover, and compete otherwise.

The risk of implicit decisions. In a family group, certain decisions remain informally reserved to the family, because they touch on brands or on people. When the division of roles is not written, these grey areas translate into delayed decisions, which the executive reads as a lack of support and the board as a lack of execution.

Common mistakes

Judging at twelve months on the indicator that moves fastest. Debt, costs and disposals respond within months, desirability within years. Assessing on the former means rewarding what is easy to measure. It can lead an executive to over-invest in these levers at the expense of the others.

Confusing a technical rebound with a turnaround. A weak comparison base mechanically produces a better figure. The board must ask what has changed in the business, by brand and by region, and not only the overall trend.

Leaving the division of roles to personal understanding. A separation that rests on the quality of a relationship wears out with the first difficulty. What holds is a written allocation of decisions, with review dates, that each party has signed.

Renegotiating the mandate along the way without saying so. Moving from a clean-up mandate to a growth mandate changes the profile expected of the executive. If the board changes its expectations without announcing it, it assesses the executive on a mandate it never gave him.

Not looking at the team around the executive. A turnaround that rests on one person is not a turnaround, it is a dependency. The depth of the leadership team, the stability of the brand chief executives and the solidity of internal governance count as much as the group's figures.

How to assess a turnaround executive at twelve months

Six questions that any board can ask itself without knowing the sector inside out.

1. What does the balance sheet say, and what did it cost? Debt that falls quickly may come from disciplined execution or from assets sold. Distinguishing the two reveals whether the executive knows how to clean up or only how to sell. Ask for the detail of the levers, and what remains to be done.

2. Are the announced milestones met, in the announced order? At Kering, 84 net closures against around 100 planned, at the half-year mark. A milestone met measures execution. A milestone exceeded too early may reveal haste.

3. Is the main brand progressing on the indicators that precede sales? Margin, traffic, quality of the network, rhythm of collections. Sales are only the last link. An executive who presents only growth often hides what precedes it.

4. Does the team hold without him? Look at the stability of brand leadership, the depth of the general management, unplanned departures and arrivals. A turnaround that depends on one man is measured by the fragility of what surrounds him.

5. Does the executive flag what departs from the plan before the board discovers it? This is the most revealing criterion of the governance relationship. An executive who brings the bad news himself, with a hypothesis and a proposal, builds the trust that separation requires.

6. Can the board say which phase it is in, and what it expects of the next? A board that cannot name the current phase cannot assess the executive. This question applies to the board first.

Frequently asked questions

How long does it take to judge a chief executive officer in charge of a turnaround? One must distinguish between indicators. Clean-up indicators, debt, costs, cash, respond in six to twelve months. Rebuilding indicators, comparable growth and margin by brand, take two to three years. Reclaim indicators, positioning and customer loyalty, extend over four to five years. Kering's ReconKering plan is sequenced in this way: reset by the end of 2026, rebuild by 2028, reclaim by 2030.

Why separate the roles of chairman and chief executive officer? To separate supervision from execution, and to allow the board to call for accountability from someone who is not also the person who chairs it. Separation is regarded as good practice in large listed groups, and it is what Kering chose in June 2025 by entrusting the role of chief executive officer to Luca de Meo and keeping François-Henri Pinault as chairman of the board.

What is an operator CEO? An executive whose main mandate is the execution of a transformation plan, more than the definition of a vision. He is generally recruited for his method and his previous turnaround results, sometimes in another sector. His performance is judged on plan milestones, which distinguishes him from an heir or founder executive, who is judged over the long run.

Can a shareholding family remain chairman of a listed group? Yes, and this is the case in many luxury groups. This configuration requires that the chairman's role be written: what he decides, what he validates, what he leaves to the executive. Failing this, the family risks either intervening in operations, or being perceived as absent at the moment the executive needs a decision.

Which indicators should a board ask for at twelve months into a turnaround? Net debt and cash, plan milestones met, comparable growth by brand and by region, operating margin of the main asset, stability of brand leadership, and departures from the plan flagged by the executive. At Kering, the figures published at 30 June 2026 cover mainly the first three families: net debt of 3.3 billion euros, 84 net closures against around 100 planned, comparable growth of +1%.

Is a return to growth enough to conclude that a turnaround has succeeded? No. Comparable growth of +1% for the half and +2% in the second quarter is a signal, not a proof. One must verify that it comes from the business and not from a weak comparison base, that it is spread across several brands, and that it is accompanied by an improvement in margin. It is these three readings together that make a turnaround.

Key takeaways

• Twelve months after the separation of chairman and chief executive officer at Kering, the group has published a half-year of comparable growth (+1%, +2% in the second quarter), net debt of 3.3 billion euros against 8.0 at the end of 2025 and a recurring operating margin of 12.8%.

• A turnaround is read in phases, and each phase has its indicators. At twelve months, one reads mainly clean-up indicators, not reclaim indicators.

• Separation depends on what the board writes: who decides what, on which dates, against which criteria. It does not depend on the understanding between two people.

• The central asset of a luxury group recovers in four stages: product, narrative, network, customers. Sales come last.

• The most important question for a board at twelve months is not about the executive. It is about the board itself: can it name the current phase and what it expects of the next?

The Laroze Partners view

One year after the arrival of a turnaround executive, the temptation is to judge the person. It is almost always the wrong target. What can be assessed at this stage is the quality of the framework that was put in place: was the mandate clear, the phases named, the criteria known in advance, the roles written? A brilliant executive in a vague framework is judged on what he could not do. An average executive in a clear framework is judged on what he did. The board that wants to understand a turnaround begins by looking at its own rules.

The Kering case is instructive for this reason, regardless of its outcome. The separation was announced publicly, the plan was publicly divided into three phases, and the figures for each half-year are published within a known framework. It is a way of governing that allows everyone, shareholders, teams, partners, to know where things stand. Many boards, including in more modest groups, would gain from imposing this discipline on themselves: name the phase, announce the criteria, date the reviews.

This is the reading we bring to boards and shareholders who entrust a transformation to an operator executive. The Laroze Pattern®, a method for the strategic reading of trajectories, leadership behaviors and performance dynamics, serves us to distinguish, in an executive's track record, what he has already led from what is attributed to him by sector proximity: a clean-up phase is not a reclaim phase, and the one who has succeeded in the first has not yet demonstrated the second. A board that knows what it expects of each phase chooses better, assesses better, and waits better. A turnaround is judged first by the clarity of what the board had asked for.

Sources

Kering press release, first-half 2026 results, 28 July 2026 · Kering press release, first-quarter 2026 revenue, 14 April 2026 · Kering press release, Capital Markets Day, 16 April 2026 · Journal du Luxe, "Que retenir du Capital Markets Day de Kering ?", April 2026 · FashionUnited, "Kering recompose sa gouvernance", June 2025 · FashionUnited, appointment of Francesca Bellettini, 18 September 2025 · Option Finance, 15 September 2026 (Kering general secretariat) · abcbourse and Luxury Tribune, 29 July 2026 (reading of the results).